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India's WTO Challenge to Drug Enforcement
Conditions in the European Community
Generalized System of Preferences:
A Little Known Case with Major Repercussions for
"Political" Conditionality in US Trade Policy
Robert Howse*

I. INTRODUCTION'
The use of trade sanctions for broad foreign policy purposes has been a
matter of longstanding controversy in the United States. Apart from questioning
the effectiveness of such sanctions, and pointing out that they may have
innocent victims (such as workers in oppressive regimes whose jobs are
dependent on export opportunities), free traders often claim that sanctions
violate the rules of the World Trade Organization ("WTO").
In fact, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), the
centerpiece of the WTO as far as trade in goods is concerned, does not put free
trade above other political values and contains exceptions for trade measures
"necessary" for the protection of public morals and for national security
purposes. It is thus a matter of debate how much, or how little, leeway the WTO
affords to politically-motivated trade sanctions.

Professor of Law, University of Michigan. In writing this paper I have benefited greatly from
comments by Lorand Bartels, Nathaniel Berman, Deborah Cass, Claus Ehlermann, Kevin
Gray, Gary Horlick, the late Robert Hudec, Petros Mavroidis, Joost Pauwelyn, Dan Tarullo,
Richard Tarasofsky, and Chantal Thomas. Dr. Bartels' own work on this dispute is now
published in the Journal of International Economic Law, and those who read it will see how
general is my debt to him, even though my analysis goes in quite different directions. See
Lorand Bartels, The WUTO Enabling Clause and Positive Conditionaliy in the European Communiy's
GSP Program, 6 J Intl Econ L 507 (2003).
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Environmental Linkages in the EC GeneraliZed Sstem of Prferences, in Eyal Bevenisti and Moshe
Hirsch, eds, The Impact of InternationalLaw on InternationalCooperation(Cambridge forthcoming
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While political sanctions that withdraw trade concessions to which the US
is legally bound under WTO rules have been divisive, the conditioning of
Generalized System of Preferences ("GSP") on criteria that are argued to be
political has been much less controversial. These preferences are voluntarily
granted to developing countries to assist their economic development and not
bound as legal commitments in the WTO. As Lance Compa and Jeffrey Vogt
explain, "[t]he GSP is a centerpiece of U.S. trade policy, providing preferential
duty-free entry for more than 4,650 products from approximately 140 designated
beneficiary countries and territories. 2
From the outset, countries with a Communist system of government have
been denied access to GSP treatment. In addition, US GSP status may not be
granted or may be withdrawn if a country fails to take steps to afford certain
core labor rights or if it harbors terrorists.' In the wake of the attacks on
September 11, 2001, the 2002 Trade Bill extended the anti-terrorism criteria so
as to deny GSP preferences to any country that "has not taken steps to support
the efforts of the United States to combat terrorism." 4
But around the same time that Congress was strengthening the antiterrorism conditions in the GSP, India brought a case to the WTO dispute
settlement mechanism that will challenge the very possibility that any such
conditions on GSP are legal within the WTO system.' The case, which is against
the European Community ("EC"), originally attacked conditions relating to the
environment, labor rights, and drug enforcement. The case is now limited to the
issue of drug enforcement conditions, which, if met, would lead the EC to grant
preferences at a higher rate than the EC normally grants to developing countries.
But India's argument is sweeping, and if it wins this case, the consequences for
the United States will be clearly serious: Congress and the President will no
longer be able to grant or withdraw GSP treatment on the basis of American
policy objectives and American political values, unless those actions can be
justified under exception provisions in the WTO Agreements (such as the
exception for public morals and for national security in GATT). GSP conditions
2

3

4
5

Lance Compa and Jeffrey S. Vogt, Labor Regulation and Trade: Labor R'ghts in the Generalized
System of Preferences.'A 20-Year Review, 22 Comp Labor L & PolyJ 199, 201 (2001).
Office of the United States Trade Representative, Executive Office of the President, U.S.
Generali.zed System of Preferences Guidebook 23-24 (1999), available online at
<http://www.ustr.gov/reports/gsp/index.html> (visited Oct 9, 2003).
Trade Act of 2002, § 4102(a), Pub L No 107-210, 116 Stat 933, codified at 19 USCA
2462(b)(2)(F) (West Supp 2003).
World Trade Organization, Request for the Establishment of a Panel by India, European
Communities-Conditionsfor the Granting of TariffPrefirences to Developing Countries, WTO Doc No
WT/DS246/4 (Dec 9, 2002), available online at <http://docsonine.wto.org/
DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/246-4.doc> (visited Oct 6, 2003). Earlier, Thailand and several
other countries requested consultations on the EC measures but have not yet filed requests
for a panel.
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will be subject to similar concerns about WTO legality-or illegality-as trade
sanctions that entail rolling back negotiated, legally binding WTO concessions.
Since GSP conditionality has often, in US trade policy, allowed for a
compromise between free traders, who are fastidious about not backing away
from WTO commitments, and those who believe America's trade should reflect
America's political values and interests, a win for India in this case would have a
significant impact on the politics of trade policy in Washington, probably
provoking a starker and more polarized debate about sanctions, and perhaps
more willingness on the part of lawmakers to test the limits of WTO rules in this
regard.
II. THE ENABLING CLAUSE AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO
ARTICLE 1:1 OF GATT (MFN)
While the Generalized System of Preferences is provided on a voluntary
basis and is not binding on the United States, such preferences nevertheless
require an authorization or a legal basis in GATT; otherwise, by providing to
developing countries better tariff treatment under the GSP than the bound rates
of tariff provided to all other WTO Members, the United States would be in
violation of the Most Favored Nation ("MFN") clause in GATT Article 1:1.
The legal basis for GSP is found in a GATT/WTO legal instrument
referred to as the Enabling Clause ("the Clause"),6 which authorizes GATT
Contracting Parties/WTO Members to operate the Generalized System of
Preferences "notwithstanding" the MFN obligation in Article 1:1.
India's argument regarding the Clause is that it contains a requirement of
non-discrimination as between different developing countries. On this narrow
view, the Enabling Clause authorizes countries providing GSP treatment to give
better tariff treatment to developing countries as a whole, but does not permit,
within a GSP scheme, different developing countries to be treated differently.
There is, however, no non-discrimination requirement of this kind on the
face of the Enabling Clause. India infers such a requirement from Paragraph 2(a)
of the Clause, which deals with the applicability of the Clause to preferential
tariff treatment. Paragraph 2(a) refers to "[p]referential tariff treatment accorded
by developed contracting parties to products originating in developing countries in
accordance with the Generali.zed System of Preferences."' Through a footnote, the
Enabling Clause defines a Generalized System of Preferences as what was
described by an earlier GATT legal instrument, the 1971 GSP Decision.8 The
description in the 1971 GSP decision is: "a mutually acceptable system of
6

Differential and More Favorable Treatment Rectprodo and Fuller Parfipationof Developing Countries,

7

Nov 28, 1979, GATT BISD (26th Supp) 203 (1980) (hereinafter Enabling Clause).
Id 2(a) (emphasis added).
GeneralizedSystem of Preferences,June 25, 1971, GATT BISD (18th Supp) 24 (1972).

8
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generalized, non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory preferences beneficial to the
developing countries in order to increase the export earnings, to promote the
industrialization, and to accelerate the rates of economic growth of these
countries."9
Thus, India's argument that the Enabling Clause prohibits discrimination
between developing countries rests on the following syllogism: (1) the Enabling
Clause requires that preferential tariff treatment be in "accordance with a
Generalized System of Preferences"; (2) the Enabling Clause defines GSP
through incorporating (from the 1971 instrument) a description that includes the
idea of non-discrimination; therefore (3) it is illegal, in every respect, to treat
different developing countries differently within a GSP scheme.
Yet there is an enormous leap from the second premise of the syllogism to
the conclusion that India seeks to draw. Given that the drafters of the Enabling
Clause decided not to include explicitly a non-discrimination provision in the
Enabling Clause, it is an open question what legal effect is created by saying that
preferential treatment must be in accordance with a general description of GSP
as, inter alia, non-discriminatory.
It should be conceded at the outset that India is right that, as a general
matter, the Enabling Clause, including Paragraph 2(a), is justidable, that is, that
the Clause creates some legal effects. In the 1992 case, Denial of Most-FavouredNation Treatment as to Non-Rubber Footwearfrom Brazil ("BrazilRubber Footwea?),'°a
GATT Panel examined whether the Enabling Clause would render legal under
GATT preferential treatment with respect to countervailing duties that would
otherwise be in violation of Article I. The panel held: "It was clear that the
Enabling Clause expressly limits the preferential treatment accorded by
developed contracting parties in favour of developing contracting parties under
the Generalized System of Preferences to tariff preferences only."" The panel
noted dicta from an earlier report, United States-Customs User Fee, which
considered that a non-tariff measure in violation of GATT Article I was not
"authorized" by the Enabling Clause. 2
In sum, the Enabling Clause is justiciable. However, the nature and
extent of the legal effect of individual provisions within the Enabling Clause is a
different matter. That question has to be answered as a matter of interpretation,
following the rules in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties; the
ordinary meaning of the words in question must be considered in light of their
object, purpose, and context.

9

10
11
12

Id at 25.
Report by the Panel, June 19, 1992, GATT BISD (39th Supp) 128 (1993).
Id at 153, 6.15.
Report by the Panel, Feb 2, 1988, GATT BISD (35th Supp) 245, 290

122 (1989).

Vol. 4 No. 2

India's WTO Challenge to Drug Enforcement Conditions

Howse

Some provisions in WTO legal instruments have been held to have a
largely aspirational character. In the Beef Hormones13 case, for instance, the
Appellate Body ("AB") found certain provisions of the Agreement on Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Measures ("SPS")'4 to be in the nature of "best efforts"
obligations, where Members were being exhorted to achieve progressively a
certain goal, but without a binding legal commitment to reach the goal to a
particular extent or degree at a particular future point in time. 5 The AB based
that interpretation of the legal force or effect of Article 3.1 on a contextual
analysis, pointing to wording in the Preamble of the SPS Agreement, as well as
the impracticality and unreasonableness of an interpretation that would impose
an immediate, absolute obligation on Members to base all of their regulations on
international standards.
It is worth noting that the language "shall" appeared in Article 3.1 of the
SPS; the AB's ruling in Beef Hormones illustrates that even the presence of
wording, which suggests a "hard" legal obligation, is not itself conclusive
evidence of the nature and extent of the legal effect of a given provision, which
must be considered contextually. 6
More recently, in the Corn Syrup 7 case, the Appellate Body considered the
legal effect of certain provisions of the Dispute Settlement Understanding,
including Article 3.7, which provides, in part, that "[b]efore bringing a case, a
Member shall exercise its judgement as to whether action under these procedures
would be fruitful."' 8 The AB interpreted the legal effect of this provision "to be
largely self-regulatinf': "Article 3.7 neither requires nor authorizes a panel to look
behind that Member's decision and to question its exercise of judgment."' 9

13
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15
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18
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World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, EC Measures ConcerningMeat and
Meat Products (Hormones), WTO Doc Nos WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan 16,
1998) (hereinafter Beef Hormones).
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal
Instruments-Results
of the Uruguay Round (1994), available online at
<http://www.wto.org/english/docse/legaLe/1 5-sps.pdf> (visited Oct 11, 2003).
BeefHormones at 64-65,
162-65 (cited in note 13) (referencing SPS Article 3.1).
For a similar analysis by a panel under the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement, see In the
Matter of Puerto Rico Regulations on the Import, Distribution and Sale of U.H.T. Milk from Quebec,
1993 FTAPD LEXIS 18, *75-76, 5.23 (June 3, 1993).
World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, Mexico-Anti-Dumping Investigation
of High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS)from the United States: Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the
United States, WTO Doc No WT/DS132/AB/RW (Oct 22, 2001), available online at
<http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/132ABRW.doc> (visited Oct 9,
2003) (hereinafter Corn Syrup).
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art 3.7, Apr
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal
Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, reprinted in 33 ILM 1226, 1227 (1994).
Corn Syrup at 23-24,
73-74 (cited in note 17).
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But it is arguable that the Enabling Clause is a very different kind of legal
provision than Article 3.7 of the DSU. For example, WTO law tends to regard
the provisions of waivers from WTO obligations as strict conditions; a Member
may only deviate from WTO obligations in reliance on a waiver if and to the
extent that it meets such conditions.
Here what is important is that the Enabling Clause does not function as a
waiver,2 ° although it is often referred to by that term in general and nontechnical discussions of GSP. Article XXV of GATT refers to waivers of an
obligation "imposed upon a contracting party" (emphasis added) in "exceptional
circumstances."'" The Enabling Clause does not mention any exceptional
circumstances, nor does it name any particular member state. It is not called a
waiver on its face. It is not temporary, as the "exceptional circumstances"
language would imply. It is not listed among the list of Article XXV waivers in
the relevant GATT/WTO instruments.
The idea of the Enabling Clause is not simply forbearance of a particular
member state's non-compliance with the existing law of GATT; the Enabling
Clause instead "enables" what has become a basic tenet of the international
economic legal order, namely special and differential treatment of developing
countries. It modifies the existing law of GATT to enable the concept already
announced in Part IV and reflected in numerous declarations and other
instruments of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
("UNCTAD") and the United Nations Social and Economic Council. Rather
than an exception to GATT, the Enabling Clause is an integral part of GATT
legal system.
For these reasons, it would be inappropriate to apply to the interpretation
of the Enabling Clause the narrow or strict reading of waivers that the Appellate
Body promulgates in the Bananas case.22 This relates as well to the actual
language in Paragraph 1 of the Enabling Clause. Unlike, for example, the Lome
Waiver at issue in Bananas, Paragraph 1 does not use language such as "to the
extent necessary"-rather the formula employed is "[n]otwithstanding the
provisions of Article I." A developed country WTO Member does not have to
prove that each aspect of its deviation from the strictures of Article I is
necessary in order to grant differential and more favorable treatment to
developing countries. Rather, GSP operates "notwithstanding" Article I entirely.

20

21

22

See John H. Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Poliy of InternationalEconomic Relations
164 (MIT 2d ed 1997).
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art XXV, 4 GATT BISD 44 (1969), 61 Stat pts 5,
6, TIAS 1700, 55 UN Treaty Set 194 (1950).
World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, European Communities-Regime for
the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WTO Doc No WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept 9,
1997).
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This is also different from Article XXIV of GATT, the MFN exception for
customs unions and free trade areas. Article XXIV does not contain language
that renders GATT Article I inapplicable to measures taken in the operation of
customs unions and free trade areas; rather, Article XXIV, as the Appellate Body
held in Turkey-Texfiles,23 provides only that Article I shall not be applied in such a
manner as to prevent the formation of customs unions and free trade areas.
Article XXIV does not authorize the operation of customs unions and free trade
areas nothwithstandingArticle I. Instead, unlike GSP, the Article I framework still
applies in the case of customs unions and free trade areas, to the extent
consistent with their formation or existence. The Enabling Clause does not
explicitly provide for enforcement or policing of its provisions through dispute
settlement. Nor need it, of course, as a formal matter; as a decision pursuant to
GATT 1947, the Clause is part of GATT 1994 and is, therefore, an integral part
of the one of the Covered Agreements to which the DSU applies. But it is
relevant to the question of to what extent the Clause is self-policing-that the
drafters apparently did not consider the nature of its provisions to be such that it
was important to stress or emphasize the availability of dispute settlement.
Rather than a reference to dispute settlement in the Enabling Clause, one finds
in arrangements
the formula that that the "contracting parties will 2collaborate
4
provisions."
these
of
operation
for the review of the
This approach contrasts significantly with that of the predecessor
instrument to the Enabling Clause, the GSP Decision of 1971 ("Decision").25
The Decision contained detailed and explicit language concerning the availability
of dispute settlement (Paragraph E). This may be related to the fact that, unlike
the Enabling Clause, the Decision is, in legal structure, a waiver. The operative
text of the Decision states: "the provisions of Article I shall be waived for a
period of ten years to the extent necessary to permit developed [countries to provide
to developing countries generalized, non-discriminatory, non-reciprocal
preferential tariff treatment]., 26 Because, in 1971, the issue was conceived of in
terms of waiver, it is not surprising that the expectation was that the provisions
of the waiver would be viewed as strict conditions for deviation from Article I,
which would be policed in dispute settlement.
Similarly, there is a Uruguay Round instrument that affirms explicitly the
availability of dispute settlement in the case of "the failure of the Member to

23

24
25
26

World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, Turkt--Restrictions on Imports of
64, WTO Doc No WT/DS34/AB/R (Oct 22, 1999),
Textile and Clothing Products 18,
available online at <http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/34ABR.doc>
(visited Oct 6, 2003).
EnablingClause, GATT BISD (26th Supp) at 205, 9 (cited in note 6).
GeneralizedSystem ofPreferences, GATT BISD (18th Supp) at 24 (cited in note 8).
Id at 25, a (cited in note 8) (emphasis added).
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whom a waiver was granted to observe the terms or conditions of the waiver."2
Again, the issue is not justiciability as such, but rather the fact that this
instrument suggests that provisions of a waiver may well be "terms and
conditions" to be applied strictly by the dispute settlement organs. In contrast to
these three Uruguay Round legal instruments, the Doha instrument28 that
addresses the Enabling Clause makes no mention or affirmation concerning the
availability of dispute settlement to address violations of supposed terms and
conditions of the Enabling Clause. Instead it merely reaffirms that preferences
granted to developing countries under the Enabling Clause "should be
generalized, non-reciprocal, and non-discriminatory."2 9
Another consideration to remember is that the Appellate Body noted in
the Beef Hormones case the general international law principle of in dubio milius.
This principle requires that, where the extent of a legal obligation is unclear, a
treaty interpreter adopts the reading that least restricts the sovereignty of the
state that is bound:
We cannot lightly assume that sovereign states intended to impose upon
themselves the more onerous, rather than the less burdensome, obligation
by mandating conformity or compliance with such standards, guidelines and
recommendations. To sustain such an assumption and to warrant such a farreaching interpretation, treaty language far more specific and compelling...
would be necessary. 30
In the Beef Hormones case, the Appellate Body was interpreting the
expression "based on" in the SPS Agreement. The wording in Paragraph 2(a) of
the Enabling Clause, namely that preferential treatment be in accordance with the
notion of a mutually acceptable system of generalized, non-reciprocal and nondiscriminatory preferences, certainly is not "specific and compelling" enough to
suggest every aspect of a Member's scheme of preferential treatment must
conform to non-discrimination or non-discrimination as juridical norms or
conditions.
One final general consideration is the role of UNCTAD in the
implementation of the Generalized System of Preferences; this forms part of the
"context" of the Enabling Clause and its provisions, within the meaning of the
27

28

29
30

Understanding in Respect of Waivers of Obligations under the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994 3(a), Apr 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round,
reprinted in 33 ILM 1163 (1994).
See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Conference, 4th Sess, Implementation-Related Issues
and Concerns, WTO Doc No WT/MIN(01)/17 (Nov 20, 2001), available online at
<http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/minOl/17.doc> (visited Oct 6, 2003).
Within the meaning of the Vienna Convention rules on treaty interpretation, this instrument
would be relevant either as a subsequent agreement or subsequent practice of the Parties
regarding the interpretation of the treaty.
Id at 8, 12.2 (emphasis added).
Beef Hormones at 66, 165 (cited in note 13) (emphasis and internal citations omitted).
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Vienna Convention Article 31. By virtue of Trade and Development Board Resolution
75(S-TV), of October 12, 1970,31 a special committee within UNCTAD was
established to review annually the implementation of the GSP, with more indepth studies to be conducted on a less frequent basis. By the time the Enabling
Clause was negotiated, this committee had issued numerous detailed reports on
the functioning of the GSP, often with detailed recommendations. These reports
and various resolutions and other UNCTAD instruments suggest that
UNCTAD conceived of itself as having a lead role in the oversight of the GSP.
This view may account in some measure for the lack of more explicit or detailed
institutional arrangements in the text of the Enabling Clause itself.
If we look at the history of the GSP, the relevant legal texts, and
subsequent state practice in light of these general considerations, it becomes
clear that the idea of non-discrimination in the description of the GSP has a
largely, though not entirely, aspirational legal effect.
From the outset, developed countries were not willing to provide
preferential treatment that applied to all countries and all products. For example,
one might view the notion of preferences having to be "generalized" and "nondiscriminatory" as requiring that every element of a Member's scheme of
preferences fully conform to that description in order to take advantage of
waiver treatment under the 1971 Decision or the override of the Enabling
Clause. Under this view, however, the GSP would never have gotten off the
ground. Developed countries would have been prevented from offering
preferences on terms that were acceptable to them. In this respect, the language
"mutually acceptable" informs and conditions the entire description of the
Generalized System of Preferences in the Preamble of the 1971 GSP Decision.
That description cannot impose conditions or limitations on the manner in
which GSP treatment is granted or withdrawn if those conditions are not
"mutually acceptable" to both developed and developing countries.32
31

UN Trade and Development Board Res No 75 (S IV), Terms of Reference of the Special

32

Committee on Preferences (Oct 12, 1970), available online at <http://rO.unctad.org/en/
subsites/archiv/leg29.htm> (visited Oct 11, 2003).
According to Juan Carlos Sinchez Arnau, Ambassador, Permanent Mission of Argentina and
former Chair of the Committee on Trade and Environment of the WTO, from the inception
of GSP, "it was tacitly agreed that any donor country would have the powers to extend the
preferential treatment to any other country or to withdraw this treatment if there should be
any valid reason for this in the opinion of the preference-giving country," despite the fact
that "the developing countries' stance was that preferential treatment should be given to all
countries coming under this category, whatever their political system .... Juan C. Sinchez
Arnau, The Generalized System of Preferences and the World Trade OTganization 205 (Cameron May
2002). See also Georges Abi-Saab, Analytical Study, in United Nations, Report of the SecretayGeneral on the Progressive Development of the Princples and Norms of International Law Relating to the
New International Economic Order, UN Doc No A/39/504 at 78, 146 (1984) (hereinafter the
Report), concluding that, while the GSP notions of "preferential" and "non-reciprocal" ...
"have been crystallized and are generally accepted [as international law], the same cannot be
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The aspirational character of the notion of preferences being generalized,
non-discriminatory and non-reciprocal is reflected as recently as the Doha
Decision on Implementation in 2001. The Doha Decision, as noted above,
"reaffirms" that preferences granted under the Enabling Clause should have these
characteristics but does not provide any defined timetable for the achievement
of this goal, or any clear guidelines as to how fully it must be achieved at a given
future point in time.
The Comprehensive Review of the Generalized System of Preferences by the
UNCTAD Secretariat, issued April 9, 1979, noted that:
For various reasons, some preference-giving countries have not
recognized as beneficiaries all those developing countries which claim
developing status. Furthermore, in the administration of their schemes,
certain preference-giving countries differentiate among beneficiaries with
regard to the product coverage, the depth of tariff cut and/or the level of
preferential imports admitted. Strictly speaking, such differentiation and
selectivity contravenes the principle of non-discrimination....
The principles on which generalized, non-reciprocal and nondiscriminatory preferences should be based need to be reaffirmed, and the
preference-giving countries should agree to take appropriate measures for
the full observance of these principles. To this effect, they should extend
countries without
generalized tariff preferences to all developing
33
discrimination, reciprocity or any other conditions.
Here, the language "should" and "should agree" displays the understanding
that developed countries are, not strictly speaking, bound to take the action in
question. Non-discrimination and non-reciprocity are "principles" that
developed countries need to agree in the future to take measures that will result in
"full observance"; that is, they are not yet bound by any agreement to such full
observance.
But the UNCTAD Membership has not been prepared to go even this far;
the relevant language in the Declaration at UNCTAD IX in 1996 merely states:
"There is concern among the beneficiaries that the enlargement of the scope of
the GSP by linking eligibility to non-trade considerations may detract value from
its original principles, namely non-discrimination, universality, burden sharing
and non-reciprocity., 34 This language is obviously a far cry from a claim that
such linkages are sufficient to deprive a GSP scheme of its character as a mutually

33

34

said of the 'generalized' and 'non-discriminatory' elements." According to Abi-Saab, the
selective "individual schemes" of the GSP that have existed from the outset are a result of
the fact that "developed countries could not agree on a single uniform system of
preferences." Id at 77, 144.
Comprehensive Review of the Generalized System of Preferences, Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat 39,
153-54, UN Doc No TD/B/C.5/63 (Apr 9, 1979), in UN TDBOR, Operation and Effects of
the Generalized System of Preferences 19, UN Doc No TD/b/C.5/71 (1981).
UN Conference on Trade and Development, 9th Sess, Midrand Declarationand a Partnershipfor
Grown and Development 12, 27, UN DOC TD/377 (May 24, 1996).
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acceptable generalized, non-reciprocal, and non-discriminatory system of
preferences. And the reference to "beneficiaries" in this declaration is a
reminder that the entire description of GSP in these terms is informed by the
notion that the system is to be "mutually acceptable" to both developed and
developing countries; developed countries have never accepted that they are only
able to operate a GSP scheme where the scheme is completely unconditional
and non-selective.
Just prior to the coming into force of the Uruguay Round Agreements, and
the incorporation of the Enabling Clause into GATT 1994, the 1994 Joint
Declaration of the EC and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
("ASEAN") shows that concerns about labor conditionality in the EC's new
GSP scheme were not understood to involve a claim of WTO illegality. The
language of the Declaration is as follows:
The Ministers recognized that the General System of Preferences
(GSP) has contributed to the growth in exports from ASEAN to the EU.
More than one third of ASEAN's exports to the EU enjoy tariff
concessions under the GSP. The Ministers noted that the EU envisages a
revision and updating of the GSP for the next decade. In this context, the
Ministers recognised that the Cumulative Rules of Origin (CRO) provision
has contributed to ASEAN's regional integration and would further assist
ASEAN in achieving its objectives of an ASEAN Free Trade Area. [ ] The
ASEAN Ministers stressed their concerns about certain elements such as
"Social Incentives" in the Commission proposals on the review of the
35

GSP.
It is clear that although the ASEAN Ministers had "concerns" about some
conditions in GSP that differentiated between different developing countries,
these concerns did not lead to the least hint of questioning the legality of the EC
GSP scheme under the GATT Enabling Clause. Moreover, it is clear that there
was no agreement between the EC and the ASEAN Ministers that such
incentives were disciplined in any legal sense by WTO rules.
In sum, the subsequent practice of member states strongly points to an
interpretation of the notion of a "non-discriminatory" and "non-reciprocal"
system of preferences as aspirational. Despite persistent concern by developing
countries about conditionality and selectivity in GSP schemes over a period of

almost 30 years, no legal instrument has ever been promulgated that elevates the
elements of non-discrimination or non-reciprocity to a legal condition precedent
for the granting of preferences that would otherwise be inconsistent with
Article I.
The policy basis for continuing to treat these elements as, at most, basic
principles which developed countries are exhorted to reflect in their GSP
35

Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Joint Declaration:The Eleventh ASEAN-EU Ministerial
Meeting Karlsruhe, 22-23
September 1994
at
10,
available
online
at
<http://www.aseansec.org/5642.htm> (visited Oct 11, 2003).
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schemes, is expressed in the judgment of a 1998 report to the Economic and
Social Council ("ECOSOC") by the Secretariats of UNCTAD and the WTO:
"[despite, inter alia, selectivity and conditionality in some GSP schemes,] the GSP
remains a valuable tool for promoting developing-country exports." 36 When
balanced against various "improvements" in GSP treatment, including "a
substantial extension of product coverage for all GSP recipients,"3 the
remaining or new elements of selectivity and conditionality did not justify
moving to a stricter approach, enforcing the elements of non-discrimination and
non-reciprocity as legal conditions precedent. Leaving aside whether it could
ever be part of "mutually acceptable" GSP arrangements, such a stricter
approach might lead to waning enthusiasm on the part of developed countries to
further extend and improve their GSP schemes to the benefit of developing
countries. Thus, the repeated reaffirmations of non-discrimination and nonreciprocity as principles of the GSP, up to and including the Doha Decision on
Implementation, have never been accompanied by requirements that aspects of
WTO Members' GSP schemes that detract
from those principles be removed or
38
modified within a definite time frame.
In the Brazil Rubber Footwear case, in determining whether preferences fall
within Paragraph 2(a), the panel noted that "[t]he GSP programme of the United
States, both in its nature and its design, accords duty-free status to only certain
products originating in only certain developing countries." ' The panel further
noted that this entailed both a tariff and a non-tariff advantage to the selected
beneficiaries. The panel made it very clear that selective duty-free treatment
under the US GSP scheme was excluded from the Article I override in the
Enabling Clause, only to the extent that such duty free treatment results in the
conferral of an additional, non-tariff preference on the beneficiary; while tariff
preferences that are provided on a selective basis, both in respect of products
and countries, are protected by the Enabling Clause Paragraph 2(a), non-tariff
preferences are not.4"
36

UN Conference on Trade and Development, Market Access: Developments since the Uruguay
Round, Implications, Opportunities and Challenges, in Particularfor the Developing Countries and the
Least Developed among Them, in the Context of Globalization and LiberaliZation, 1998 Sess at 11, 1
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39-40, UN Doc No E/1998/55 (1998), available online at <http://www.unctad.org/
en/docs/e1998d55.en.pdf> (visited Oct 10, 2003).
Id at 11,1$39.
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Contrast this with the Uruguay Round Understanding on the Balance-of-Payments
Provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 ("Balance of Payments
Understanding"), which re-affirms the commitment "to announce publicly, as soon as
possible, time-schedules for the removal of restrictive import measures taken for balance-ofpayments purposes." Balance of Payments Understanding
1, Apr 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, Legal InstrumentsResults of the Uruguay Round, reprinted in 33 ILM 1158 (1994).
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GATF BISD (39th Supp) at 152,
See id at 152-53,$T 6.14-6.15.
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6.14 (cited in note 10).
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The wisdom of this interpretive approach is strongly confirmed if we
consider the jurisprudential challenge for the dispute settlement organs if, under
Paragraph 2(a), non-discrimination or non-reciprocity were considered to be
legal conditions that determined whether GATT Article I override was
applicable to a given case of preferential treatment.
In the GATT/WTO legal framework, non-discrimination is a complex and
varied concept. One need only contrast, to use a single example, the notion of
discrimination in Article I of GATT, which involves a comparison of the
treatment of like products with the concept in the chapeau (preambular paragraph)
of Article XX, which entails a comparison of the treatment of countries "where
the same conditions prevail." The concept of non-discrimination in Article III of
GATT is different yet again, informed as it is by the objective of avoiding
protection of domestic production.4'
Neither the Enabling Clause nor the GSP Decision of 1971, to which the
Clause refers, provides the dispute settlement organs of the WTO with a textual
anchor in articulating an appropriate concept of discrimination to apply to these
complex legal and administrative facts. An appropriate comparator is not even
specified.
If they were to regard each element of a Member's GSP scheme as
reviewable against independent (but undefined) legal norms of nondiscrimination and non-reciprocity, the dispute settlement organs would be
throwing into profound uncertainty the operation of the GSP as it now stands;
all of these schemes contain elements of selectivity and conditionality that could,
on some conception of discrimination or other, be viewed as discriminatory.
This uncertainty would in the short term make the preferences in question even
more precarious and uncertain from the perspective of developing countries,
and in the longer term perhaps erode the viability of any "mutually acceptable"
system of preferences.4 2 These consequentialist concerns would not matter if the
dispute settlement organs were explicitly directed to adjudicate nondiscrimination as a legal condition of the Enabling Clause (as was the case with
Article XXIV of GATT in Turkey-Textiles), but they do certainly go to whether

41
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See World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, European CommunitiesMeasures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products 37,
97-98, WTO Doc No
WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar 12, 2001), available online at <http://docsonline.wto.org/
DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/135ABR.doc> (visited Oct 10, 2003).
On the difficulties of drawing a line between permissible and impermissible differential
treatment within a preferential, and thus inherently discriminatory scheme, see Robert E.
Hudec, The Structure of South-South Trade Preferences in the 1988 GSTP Agreement: Learning to Say
MFMFN, in John Whalley, ed, 1 Developing Counties and the Global Trading System: Thematic
Studiesfrom a FordFoundationProject210 (Michigan 1989).
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such a directive or mandate should be inferred, in the absence of explicit
language.43
India seeks to avoid these difficulties by arguing that the concept of "nondiscrimination" in the description of GSP, as incorporated in the Enabling
Clause, refers to the requirement of MFN treatment between developing
countries; in other words, India selects Article 1:1 of the GATT as the
appropriate concept of non-discrimination-this despite the fact that, according
to the very language of the Enabling Clause, the system of preferences that the
Clause authorizes may operate "notwithstanding" the MFN obligation in Article
I:1 of the GATT.
According to India, "[i]n all GATT provisions and in GATT and WTO
jurisprudence, the term 'discriminatory' has been used to describe the denial of
equal competitive opportunities to like products originating in different
countries." 4 This is manifestly false: as already noted, the chapeau of Article XX,
the general exceptions provision of the GATT, refers to the concept that when
invoking Article XX as a justification for their measures, state parties must not
apply those measures in such a manner as to constitute "unjustifiable" or
"arbitrary" discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail.
Contra India, the concept of "products" or "like products" does not even
appear in the chapeau of Article XX. Ironically, India, in its pleadings, insists that
the Enabling Clause should be treated as a kind of exception to GATT
obligations. If this is true, then one would think that the most relevant reference
to discrimination in the GATT would indeed be a reference in another
exceptions provision, which (albeit in a different way from the Enabling Clause)
also permits states parties to derogate from MFN. The language of "arbitrary"
and "unjustifiable discrimination" is explicitly qualified by the notion that such
discrimination only matters if it concerns countries "where the same conditions
prevail." This notion therefore would clearly permit differential treatment of
different developing countries if there are different conditions in those
countries.
The fact remains that this notion of discrimination is not explicitly
incorporated into the Enabling Clause, and even less plausibly, the idea of MFN
43

44

It is true that T 2(d) of the Enabling Clause, in explicitl allowing additional margins of
preferences to be granted to least-developed countries, could be interpreted as implicitly
prohibiting the granting of additional margins of preferences to any select group of countries
within a GSP scheme except on grounds that they are "least developed." In this sense, it
could be argued that there is one permitted comparator for differential treatment within GSP
schemes, whether a country is "least developed," with all other comparators prohibited. But
given the enormous consequences described above in the text, it would seem to be judicial
overreaching to derive a prohibition on other distinctions within GSP schemes by
implication alone of what ispermitted in 2(d).
World Trade Organization, Panel's Questions to the Parties and Third Parties, European
Cormmunities-TarffPrefrences11-12 (May 20,2003) (on file with author).
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discrimination. That the idea of non-discrimination in the Enabling Clause is not
defined in terms of the way non-discrimination appears anywhere else in the
GATT simply illustrates that the reference to a non-discriminatory and
nonreciprocal system of preferences that is incorporated into the Enabling
Clause is of an aspirational nature, and is not determinate enough to create
enforceable conditions, without the adjudicator being forced to invent, or weave
from whole cloth, a legal test for discrimination. However, just as subsequent
practice sustains this conclusion as a general matter, subsequent practice,
including adopted GATT panel reports and the existence of waivers such as the
Lome Waiver, also suggests that there are some kinds of discriminatory
preferential relations clearly understood by both developed and developing
countries in general, to fall outside the ambit of the Enabling Clause. In
particular, preference schemes confined to regional or other specific and
exclusive groupings of countries are outside the scope of the Enabling Clause.
As the panel held in the Brazil Rubber Footwear case, preferential treatment
must fall within Paragraph 2 of the Enabling Clause to benefit from the MFN
override. The WTO adjudicator must consider whether, overall or generally, the
preferential treatment at issue is in "accordance" with the description imported
from the 1971 GSP Decision. This is the very limited extent, in fact, to which
one can say that there is some discernable mutually acceptable meaning to the
idea of non-discrimination in relation to GSP: there are certain kinds of
discriminatory preferential schemes that are agreed to fall outside the idea or
concept of GSP. But, whatever criticisms have been made of elements of policy
conditionality in developed countries' GSP programmes, such as in UNCTAD,
these criticisms have never been couched in terms that suggest in any way that
the programmes, by virtue of those elements of conditionality, fall outside the
GSP rubric altogether.
III. THE EC's WEAK DEFENSE OF GSP CONDITIONALITY
The European Community, in its first submission to the WTO panel,45
essentially concedes to India that the Enabling Clause contains a hard legal
obligation of "non-discrimination" that applies to all aspects of a WTO
Member's GSP scheme. This despite the overwhelming cumulative evidence
(mustered above) that "non-discrimination" is incorporated into the enabling
clause as a largely aspirational norm or objective.
The EC instead argues that it may nevertheless impose conditions on the
granting of GSP treatment, provided those conditions are non-discriminatory.

4

World Trade Organization, First Written Submission of the European Communities, ECConditionsfor the Granting of Trade Preferences to Developing Countries, WTO Doc No WT/DS246
(Apr 17, 2003) (on file with CJIL) (hereinafter EC Submission).

Fall2003

ChicagoJournalof InternationalLaw

The EC claims that not all differences in treatment amount to discrimination; it
depends upon whether the distinctions are considered unjust or illegitimate.
But as I have argued above, the Enabling Clause lacks any explicit statement or
indication of what grounds are permissible for distinguishing between different
developing countries, and what grounds are not permissible. The Enabling
Clause is silent on this crucial question.
The argument of the EC is that it can infer from the economic
development goal of the Enabling Clause the notion that one ground on which
it is permissible to distinguish between different developing countries is drug
enforcement. According to the EC, developing countries with drug enforcement
challenges have different development needs than countries without those
challenges, and therefore it is not "discriminatory" to give these countries an
additional margin of preference over other developing countries without a drug
problem.46
The EC claims that non-discrimination in WTO law need not mean formal
equality. Sometimes different treatment is what produces equality.47 The
problem with this line of argument is that, in singling out developing countries
with drug enforcement challenges, the EC treats them better-not just
differently-than other developing countries without those challenges.
The nub of the EC claim seems to be that this is not realy better treatment,
since the extra margin of preference merely compensates for the drug
enforcement burden that other developing countries, without drug enforcement
challenges, do not have to bear. This notion, however, turns out to be a sham,
once one considers that drug enforcement challenges are just one kind of
burden out of many that a particular group of developing countries may have to
bear. If the EC is willing to compensate for this kind of burden, is it not true
that the EC discriminates when it fails to provide an extra margin of preferences
for those developing countries that, for example, have a particularly severe
AIDS problem, or complicated issues of ethnic and religious diversity, or have
suffered from climatic disasters? In all such instances, increased export
opportunities might well provide more economic resources with which to
address such burdens, and therefore lighten them.
The EC goes on to argue, in the alternative, that even if its drug
preferences are found to be "discriminatory," they are "necessary" for the
protection of public health under the Article XX (b) exception in GATT.48
46

Id

47

Id 72-79.
The Article XX(b) exception reads:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised
restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be
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dispute that narcotic drugs pose a risk to human
"The EC considers it beyond
' 49
EC.
the
in
health
or
life
This very argument shows the sham involved in the EC claim that it is
singling out developing countries with drug enforcement challenges in order to
ensure that those countries are treated in accordance with their special
development needs. The EC has in fact singled out drugs from other kinds of
burdens particular developing countries might bear, not so as to treat all
developing countries according to their own special development needs, but
because of a desire to protect its own citizens from drugs.5 0
Why would the EC make a weak and tendentious argument to defend its
preferences as "non-discriminatory," while conceding or not making the much
stronger argument that the concept of "non-discrimination" in the Enabling
Clause does not, in the first place, have the sort of strong legal effects India has
attributed to it?
Certainly, the European Commission was aware of the considerations
pointing to a different and much weaker legal effect, which have been developed
earlier in this article.51
While thinking it could save its drug preferences through an Article XX
exception on public health, if need be, perhaps the Commission wanted to make
it more difficult for the United States to attach different kinds of political
conditions to its own GSP, for example, conditions related to communist
countries and to the war on terrorism-matters on which there are serious
differences between Europe and America. By not challenging India's general
view of "non-discrimination" in the Enabling Clause, making a weak argument
about the "non-discriminatory" nature of the drug preferences in particular, and
reserving its strong points for the Article XX justification, the Commission may
indeed have had just this effect.

construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party
of measures ...
b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art XX(b), 3 GATT BISD 43 (1958).
49
50

51

EC Submission at 166 (cited in note 45).
Thus, India pointedly observed in its written responses to questions from the panel, "The
EC characterizes the drug arrangements as both 'a measure to protect human health' and 'a
measure providing special and differential treatment to developing countries.' India believes
that this simultaneous characterization of the drug arrangements is logically contradictory."
World Trade Organization, Panel's Questions to the Parties and Third Parties, Euopean
Communiies-TatiffPreferences at 28 (cited in note 44).
Letter from Pascal Lamy, EC Commissioner for Trade, to the author (Feb 10, 2003) (on file
with author) (acknowledging having received and read an earlier paper by the author that
outlines these considerations).

Fall2003

ChicagoJournal of International Law

IV. THE THIRD PARTY INTERVENTION OF THE ANDEAN
GROUP OF COUNTRIES

In contrast to the EC, the Andean Group of countries (Bolivia, Columbia,
Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela), in its Third Party Submission to the panel, raised
the fundamental issues about the legal nature and effect of the Enabling Clause,
vhich are discussed above in this article, and in earlier work by the author with
which the Andean Group and their legal counsel were familiar.52 The Andean
Group noted:
[Tihe Enabling Clause is not a waiver from Article 1:1 GATT. Unlike its
predecessor, the 1971 Decision, the Enabling Clause is not described on its
face as a waiver. Moreover, Article XXV GATT refers to waivers of an
obligation 'imposed on a contracting party.' The Enabling Clause does not

refer to any exceptional circumstances, nor is it temporary nor does it name
any particular contracting party. It goes without saying that it would be
inappropriate to apply to the interpretation of the Enabling Clause the idea

of narrow or strict reading of exceptions or waivers .... 53
In addition to this and other considerations canvassed by the present
author, the Third Party Submission of the Andean Group points to the
negotiating history of the 1971 Decision, the predecessor instrument to the
Enabling Clause. In these negotiations wording was proposed that would have
explidty prohibited differential preferential treatment as between different
developing countries, but this wording was found unacceptable and therefore
left out of the final text. 4 (I would further note that such wording was not
reintroduced when the Enabling Clause itself was negotiated at the end of the
1970s.)
At the same time, the Andean Group does not explicitly address what
precise legal effect, if any, flows from the description of GSP as nondiscriminatory that is imported into the Enabling Clause from the 1971
Decision. It rejects the Indian argument that the Enabling Clause in effect
requires MFN treatment between different developing countries in the granting
of preferences, but does not explicitly disassociate itself from the EC position
that there is a strict legal requirement of non-discrimination in the Enabling
clause, albeit a different notion of "non-discrimination" than that promulgated
by India. At the same time, in emphasizing, as just noted, that it would be
inappropriate to interpret the Enabling Clause as a waiver with strict conditions,
52

53

54

Conversation with Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, counsel for the Andean Group in this matter, in
Washington, DC (Apr 3, 2003). The earlier paper is Howse, Back to Court after Shrimp/Turtle
(cited in note 1).
World Trade Organization, Third Party Submissions of Bolivia, Columbia, Ecuador, Peru,
and Venezuela, European Communities-Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing
Countries 44, WTO Doc No WT/DS246 (Apr 30, 2003) (on file with author).
Id.
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the Andean Group seems to take the view that non-discrimination in the
Enabling Clause should not be read in the manner of a condition present in the
waiver, that is, a strict legal precondition to reliance on the override.
V. THE THIRD PARTY INTERVENTION OF THE UNITED STATES

TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
Given the possibility that the European arguments against India would not
adequately defend the United States's own interest in maintaining the
prerogative to operate GSP in accordance with American policy objectives and
political values, one would have expected, in this case, a very strong third
country brief from the United States.
In fact, the US brief is a scant three pages long, and it confines itself largely
to an arcane, technical argument that India has failed to meet its burden of proof
to show that the EC has violated the Enabling Clause. The Brief makes no
defense whatsoever of the general prerogative of United States lawmakers to
grant or withdraw GSP treatment on the basis of "political" criteria. It merely
urges the WTO dispute panel to "adopt a careful, prudent approach to resolving
this dispute" and alludes to "the many nuances found in the GSP programs of
various Members. 5
Curiously, however, in oral argument before the panel, the United States
appears to have echoed or perhaps even endorsed the concerns raised by the
Andean Group about the legal nature and effect of the provisions of the
Enabling Clause, noting "the United States joins the many developing country
third parties to this dispute that have pointed out the practical difficulty of
reading legal obligations into the Enabling Clause that are not found in the
text.

56

Later in its written answers to questions from the panel, the United States
Trade Representative ("USTR") refers to the provisions of the Enabling Clause
as "a guide for countries wishing to extend GSP preferences," 7 thereby
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World Trade Organization, Third Party Submission of the United States, European
Communities-Conditionsfor the Granting of Trade Preferences to Developing Countries1 2, WTO Doc
No WT/DS246 (Apr 30, 2003), available online at <http://www.ustr.gov/
enforcement/2003-04-30-eudeveloping-3rdpartysub.pdf> (visited Oct 10, 2003).
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World Trade Organization, Third-Party Oral Statement of the United States, European
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suggesting an obligatory force that falls short of hard legal conditions for the
granting of GSP preferences.
These rather terse, albeit suggestive, statements fall short of a vigorous
defense of the kind of interpretive approach to the Enabling Clause that would
seem needed to sustain the various kinds of conditionality in the United States's
own GSP scheme.
VI. CONCLUSION
If the WTO dispute settlement mechanism significantly constrains the
ability to impose conditionality of a "political" or policy nature on the granting
of GSP treatment to developing countries, lawmakers on Capitol Hill may well
direct their wrath, once again, at WTO judges. They should be aware, however,
that even though such a result is legally dubious at best, neither the European
Commission (for its own reasons) nor (astoundingly) the USTR (except perhaps
in oral argument), made a strong legal case in favor of conditionality under the
applicable WTO law. According to reports in the Indian and Pakistani news
58
media, the panel has in fact issued an interim ruling deciding in favor of India.
Given the weak arguments of the EC, this is not entirely a surprise. However,
apparently one member of the panel, Marsha Echols, a highly respected
American legal academic, dissented from that judgment, thus resulting in a 2-1
verdict in favor of India.
To what extent can and should judges, in an adversarial system like the
WTO, compensate for the weak or strategic arguments of the litigants, and
address broader and more foundational legal issues that the litigants have been
unable or unwilling to raise?
The Appellate Body has been, in the past, willing to decide cases on legal
grounds different from those urged by the party litigant in whose favor it is
ruling. According to Article 3.2 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding,
WTO panels and the Appellate Body have a responsibility not only to settle
individual disputes but also to clarify the law.
Assuming that the EC appeals (and that the EC feels precluded in putting
before the AB arguments that it conceded to India at first instance), the India
GSP challenge will be a vital test of how far the Appellate Body is prepared to
go beyond the four corners of adversarial litigation in order to avoid an
illegitimate result imposed by the inadequate arguments of parties to the dispute.
In this connection, the AB should take particularly seriously the Andean
58

It is WTO practice for the panel to issue an interim report to the parties in the dispute to

allow them to submit comments before the panel ruling is finalized. This interim report
generally remains confidential, although the verdict itself is typically leaked to the media. It
would be essentially unprecedented, however, for a panel to change the verdict in the final

report.
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Group's arguments-the real issues engaged by this dispute are, at least, on the
record thanks to the Andean Group Third Party Submission.
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